We develop a model where reward-based crowdfunding enables …rms to obtain a reliable proof of concept early in their production cycle. The information gathered from a subsample of backers through a …xed length pre-selling campaign enables …rms to update their beliefs about the preferences of all future consumers. This creates a valuable real option as …rms invest only if updated demand is high. Further, such updating mitigates moral hazard: the higher the funds raised, the lower the …rms' incentives to divert them. Our results are consistent with stylized facts and provide new testable implications.
Introduction
Reward-based crowdfunding platforms enable …rms to raise funds directly from future consumers, at an early stage of product development, and before making substantial investments. Funds are typically exchanged for a promise of the future delivery of a new product. 1 The funds raised through reward-based crowdfunding have been substantial and are expected to grow rapidly. Massolution (2016) estimates that $5:5 billion were raised through reward-based crowdfunding globally in 2015, i.e., over 10% of new venture capital investments, while Statista (2017) forecasts that $19 billion will be raised in 2021 in the 50 countries covered in their digital market outlook. 2 The projects that raise the most substantial amounts develop innovative consumer products. Indeed, as of January 31, 2017, 61% of the $2:5 billion raised through the Kickstarter platform have been collected by …rms that produce technology, design or gaming products. 3 While successfully funded projects, i.e., projects that met their funding target, raised $21K on average across all categories, an average successfully funded project in technology, design and games raised $90K, $62K and $55K, respectively. Further, many of these projects have raised funds comparable to those raised during an angel or venture capital investment round. 4 This success may seem surprising in the light of a well-known moral hazard problem (Tirole, 2006) : …rms may be tempted to divert funds they raised instead of delivering the products. Perhaps even more surprising is the observation that innovative …rms are those that appear to bene…t the most from reward-based crowdfunding. After all, these …rms are particularly prone to moral hazard and informational frictions 1 See e.g., Mollick 2014 . The de…ning characteristics of reward-based crowdfunding is that contrary to equity-based crowdfunding and peer-to-peer lending, …rms are not allowed to o¤er any …nancial rewards (see e.g., rules at Kickstarter https://www.kickstarter.com/rules). 2 See https://www.statista.com/outlook/335/100/crowdfunding/worldwide#market-transactionValue 3 The data available in the "Stats" section of www.kickstarter.com indicate that from Kickstarter's launch on April 28, 2009 to January 31, 2017, around 120,000 projects out of 340,000 launched in 15 categories were successfully crowdfunded. We have also collected more detailed data on a subsample of all projects launched in the Technology and Theatre categories from January 1 to September 17, 2015. 4 Business angel and venture capital have traditionally been consided to be the best sources of …nancing risky and innovative projects (Bussgang 2014 , Lerner et. al. 2012 . Venture capitalists (business angels) usually make investments worth over (below) $1 million One of the most successful …rms on Kickstarter, Pebble Technology Corporation, raised over $10 million in 2012, then $20 million in 2015, and then again $12 million in 2016 in exchange of the promised delivery of their Pebble Smartwatch. As of January 31, 2017, about 240 projects have raised over $1 million and about 4; 000 projects have raised over $100 000 on Kickstarter alone.
(Bussgang 2014).
In this paper we develop a model of crowdfunding that provides a rationale for these and other stylized facts. We emphasize that in addition to providing funding, reward-based crowdfunding platforms play an important role in enabling …rms to learn about demand before making their investment decisions. Pre-selling through these platforms can be viewed as a credible consumer survey. Since consumers pay noticeable amounts, they do not have incentives to overstate their valuation for products. For example, in 2015, the average backer contribution in a technology project was $200 while the median was $100. This consumer survey feature is made possible by a short, …xed length campaign, e.g., 1 to 60 days on Kickstarter, that ensures that only a subsample of potential consumers can …nd the product during the campaign. Observing the decisions of a random subsample of consumers enables the …rm to update its beliefs about preferences of all their future consumers, which creates a substantial real option value and enables the …rm to endogenously overcome moral hazard.
Our model emphasizes the real option of learning, which comes from the …rm's ability to develop a project only after it observes su¢ ciently high consumer demand, and to save on the investment cost if demand is low. We show that the value of learning increases with the level of prior uncertainty about future demand. This may explain why …rms that develop consumer products that involve a high degree of demand uncertainty, such as technology gadgets and computer games, have most to gain from crowdfunding. High prior uncertainty implies that crowdfunding campaigns are likely to both fail and raise funds multiple times over the target with a high probability (see Section 6) . We further show that the option value of learning is maximized when investment costs are intermediate, i.e., when projects have a NPV close to zero based on prior beliefs, and that the overall relationship between the value of learning and investment costs is inverted U-shaped. Such learning is valuable whether or not the …rm is …nancially constrained.
Our model incorporates moral hazard, as reward-based crowdfunding platforms are not legally responsible for guaranteeing the delivery of rewards and proving that a …rm has committed a fraud is di¢ cult. 5 Nevertheless, the vast majority of projects do deliver rewards (Mollick 2014) . We argue that the rarity of diversion is not due to limited moral hazard, but is due to the consumer survey feature of crowdfunding, which gives …rms su¢ cient incentives to deliver rewards. We show that campaigns that raise more funds have higher incentives to deliver products.
Speci…cally, an increase in the number of consumers who pre-order the product during the campaign has two con ‡icting e¤ects: On the one hand, an increase in the funds available increases the funds available to be diverted. On the other hand, an increase in pre-orders leads …rms to update their expectations upwards.
The increase in expected future sales dominates the immediate bene…ts of diverting funds.
For such Bayesian updating to occur, the …rm must be uncertain about the distribution from which consumer preferences are drawn. To this end, we assume that each consumer's valuation for the product is either 0 or 1, where the probability at which each consumer draws a high valuation is initially unknown to the …rm.
Consumers pre-order the product based on their own valuation, enabling the …rm to update its beliefs about the distribution of valuations and total demand. More generally, it is required that the sample from which the …rm learns about demand does not consist of individuals whose valuations are uncorrelated with that of other potential consumers. If this were the case, we would expect a small group of them to repeatedly pre-order products. However, this is at odds with the observation that the vast majority, 68% of 12:3 million backers, have only contributed to one project on Kickstarter. Since thousands of campaigns are live every day and remain live only for a short period of time, it is sensible to consider the Kickstarter sample of consumers to be representative.
We argue that third-party crowdfunding platforms bring value by externalizing commitment, enabling …rms to commit to transparency and to a …xed and limited campaign length. 6 Transparency ensures that backers observe each other's pledges during the campaign and can coordinate not to back a …rm that they expect will have insu¢ cient incentives to invest. Beside alleviating moral hazard, transparency bene…ts the …rm, which can then pre-sell the product at a minimal discount. A …xed, limited campaign length ensures that a …rm can only pre-sell the product to a limited subset of backers. In equilibrium, all consumers who …nd the product during the campaign and value it pre-order it, and the …rm sets the target so that backers do not need to actively coordinate. 7 We further compare the All-or-Nothing (AoN) and Keep-it-All (KiA) schemes. 8 We show that AoN outcomes are (almost) …rst best schemes, i.e., equivalent to a frictionless consumer survey, even in the absence of a reputation cost and legal risk. While the …rm must set a target that is higher than the …rst best investment threshold, learning about demand is also valuable to a …rm that does not meet the target. Since the equilibrium target is higher than the optimal investment threshold, this …rm may still choose to invest and to complete the project, and the absence of funds to divert ensures that there are no distortions due to moral hazard. If the failure to meet the target is associated with a reputation cost, the …rm obtains the …rst best payo¤ minus the expected value of this cost and platform fees. When reputation costs are high enough, AoN achieves the …rst best outcome. We also show that AoN Pareto dominates KiA, where the moral hazard problem prevents the …rm from investing and committing to deliver the product when it does not raise enough funds.
Our model delivers empirical predictions that are consistent with a number of existing empirical …ndings. For example, we provide a rationale for frequently oversubscribed successful campaigns, the higher success rate associated with shorter campaigns, and investment made by a number of …rms after failed AoN crowdfunding campaigns. We suggest additional testable empirical predictions regarding the relationships between …rm characteristics, prior beliefs, targets, success rates and prices. We discuss the robustness of our main …ndings to variable costs and uncertainty about the …rm's ability to develop their product idea.
Earlier theoretical explanations of reward-based crowdfunding have focused on backer preferences rather than learning and moral hazard. For example, Belle- ‡amme, Lambert, and Schwienbacher (2014) assume that participation in crowdfunding provides backers with an additional utility compared to their valuation for the product, which enables …rms to raise funds and to price-discriminate. Varian (2013) endogenizes this additional utility by deriving an equilibrium in which the seemingly altruistic preferences of backers are due to each of them having a pivotal role in ensuring that the …rm has enough funds to invest and to produce the product that the backer values. Yet, these important consumer side e¤ects cannot explain some important patterns of successful crowdfunding campaigns, such as products being sold at par or at a discount, and the fact that many products are oversubscribed multiple times over the target.
We emphasize the importance of learning about demand as an essential reason why …rms engage in reward-based crowdfunding. While news articles and research on this topic often consider …nancial constraints to be the main reason for crowdfunding, recent empirical evidence suggests otherwise (Xu, 2016) . Further, in their survey of …rms that had both successful and unsuccessful crowdfunding campaigns on Kickstarter, Mollick and Kuppuswamy (2014) …nd that the respondents reported learning about demand to be the single most important motive for crowdfunding, well ahead of funding that was only the fourth motive. In addition, they report that 30% of the …rms that failed to meet their funding target still completed their project, an observation that is consistent with the predictions of our model. 9 The argument that pre-selling enables …rms to learn about backer preferences is also emphasized in Strausz (2016) and Ellman and Hurkens (2016) . Importantly these papers contribute to the debate on the importance of moral hazard -in Strausz (2016) moral hazard is so severe that only …nancially constrained …rms with low investment costs crowdfund projects. Ellman and Hurkens (2016) abstract from moral hazard by arguing that reputation costs are high, and emphasize price discrimination instead. In contrast to ours, these two papers assume that the distribution from which individual consumer preferences is drawn is public information, so that uncertainty about demand is restricted to the number of potential consumers in a …xed population. This implies that observing the decisions of a subsample of consumers does not reveal any new information about the preferences of the population of future consumers. Hence, the optimal mechanisms they derive do not allow for the possibility that crowdfunding enables …rms to obtain a proof or concept from a small sample, which in turn creates a substantial real option value and mitigates moral hazard. 10 Indeed, in contrast to our …ndings, Strausz (2016) argues that moral hazard creates large ine¢ ciencies and it would be bene…cial to restrict information that the …rm obtains from a crowdfunding campaign. Our paper highlights 9 Cumming, Leboeuf, and Schwienbacher (2014) provide evidence consistent with the idea that All-or-Nothing schemes dominate Keep-it-All schemes. Both Mollick (2014) , and Agrawal, Catalini and Goldfarb (2015) analyze the determinants of the success probability of crowdfunding, including the importance of geography. These papers have also found a negative correlation between campaign duration and success probability, which is consistent with our model. 10 In particular, the binomial distribution in these papers is precisely equivalent to the limit where the variance of prior uncertanty about the share of high valuation consumers converges to zero in our setting, i.e., this share is known. In this special case, there is no possibility of Bayesian updating and the real option value of learning is zero. that such policy would be harmful as it would reduce the real option value of learning and increase the di¢ culty in overcoming moral hazard. Furthermore, the real option value of learning ensures that …rms that bene…t most from crowdfunding are indeed those with high demand uncertainty and substantial …xed costs, such as the technology; design and games categories. Finally, Chang (2016) considers a setting in which backers do not know their own valuation and all agents assign common value to rewards about which they obtain noisy signals. This common value assumption is best suited to …nancial rather than reward-based crowdfunding. Our empirically testable implications also suggest ways to test our model against these alternative theories. 11 Our paper also contributes to the literature that points out that investing in entrepreneurial projects enables …rms to experiment new technologies (Hellmann
2002, Gromb and Scharfstein 2005, Bettignies and Chemla 2008, Kerr, Nanda, and
Rhodes-Kropf 2014). We show that crowdfunding is an e¢ cient mechanism to learn about demand without experimentation costs. We argue that the real option to invest if demand is high enough is su¢ cient for an entrepreneur to learn about demand, leading to products better attuned to backer preferences. Crowdfunding further appears to improve accessibility to entrepreneurship. 12 More generally, our paper relates to the strands of corporate …nance and monetary economics that view asymmetric information and moral hazard as major sources of …nancial constraints (Myers 1977 , Stiglitz and Weiss 1981 , Hart 1995 , Tirole 2006 ). 13 In our setting with similar frictions, crowdfunding and traditional forms of …nancing appear to be complements. Whether or not the …rm is credit constrained only matters at the investment stage. The campaign itself may either provide actual funding or alleviate the root causes of …nancial constraints. For example, if …nancial constraints are driven by asymmetric information about demand, then the crowdfunding campaign that generates public information about demand 11 For example, large, …nancially unconstrained corporations such as Sony have crowdfunded projects. These projects can then lead to the development of new products that can be either spawned or retained (Habib, Hege, and Mella-Barral 2013). Our model also suggests a way to test the existence and magnitude of reputation costs. 12 Our paper also relates to the industrial organization literature on pre-selling (Tirole, 1988 , Rob, 1991 , Crawford and Shum, 2005 , Chu and Zhang, 2011 , which primarily focuses on the …rm's opportunity to price-discriminate. While this literature focuses on pre-selling existing products, we focus on the value of pre-selling at an earlier stage of the product cycle, while the product is still being developed and the …rm's major …xed investment decisions can still be altered. 13 In addition, the need for …nancial intermediaries stems from these and search frictions that complicate the direct interactions between …rms and consumers (Wicksell 1934 , Townsend and Wallace 1987, Kiyotaki and Moore 2002) alleviates these constraints. 14 If a …rm and its future consumers can overcome moral hazard, then the …rm's participation in crowdfunding may also alleviate the same moral hazard problem faced by traditional outside …nanciers. There are reported cases where …rms, after succeeding in reward-based crowdfunding, obtain further …nancial resources from angels, venture capitalists or investor-based crowdfunding. 15 Relatedly, investor-based crowdfunding highlights the bene…ts of learning public information from the "crowd" in terms of screening creditworthiness (see Iyer et al 2015) . 16 
The Model
We consider a three-date model in which a …rm has a new product idea, and can learn about demand after observing consumer decisions at date 0. At date 1, the …rm updates its beliefs and decides whether or not to invest I 0. At date 2 it produces and sets price p 2 at which it sells the product to consumers. For now, the …rm's marginal cost of production is zero. All agents are risk neutral and discount future cash ‡ows at rate < 1. We do not impose exogenous …nancial constraints.
The …rm's potential market consists of N consumers and the …rm can sell at most 1 unit of the product to each of them. Each consumer i 2 f1; :::; N g has private valuation v i = f0; 1g for one unit of the product and 0 for any additional unit. The fraction of consumers with valuation v i = 1 (resp. v i = 0), which we refer to as 1-consumers (resp. 0-consumers), is initially unknown to the …rm.
Private valuations are conditionally i.i.d, which implies that consumer i's valuation is a Bernoulli trial drawn from the true distribution, i.e., Pr (v i = 1j ) = . The fraction follows a beta distribution, the p.d.f. of which is
where ; are positive parameters and B ( ; ) is the beta function. Beta dis-tributions enable us to capture di¤erent distributions of prior beliefs, be they Ushaped, hump-shaped, or uniform. 17 For the sake of clarity, we write = 0 and = (1 0 ) , where 0 2 [0; 1] and > 0, such that
.
That is, 0 is the prior mean and a higher implies a lower level of uncertainty based on prior beliefs. All agents know the prior distribution. Consumer i knows his own valuation for the product. 18 We …rst assume that consumers truthfully, costlessly reveal their preferences and explore a benchmark setting where the …rm can frictionlessly learn the preferences of a subset M N backers at date 0, e.g., by asking them to respond to a survey. 19 We then relax this assumption and argue that reward-based crowdfunding provides consumers with credible incentives to truthfully reveal their preferences: While 0consumers never pre-order the product at a positive price (p 0 > 0), 1-consumers pre-order it as long as p 0 is not strictly higher than the opportunity cost of waiting and not receiving the product. We keep M …xed to compare the benchmark setting and the crowdfunding model. where m 2 f0; 1; ::; M g is the number of consumers who pre-order the product. The keep-it-all (KiA) scheme is similar, with the exception that p 0 m is passed on to the …rm regardless of whether or not the target is met. We denote S 2 fY; N g the outcome of the crowdfunding campaign, where when S = Y , the …rm's campaign is 17 If parameters ; 1 are positive integers, the beta function is given by B (x; y) = (x 1)!(y 1)! (x+y 1)! . More generally, the beta function can be expressed as B (x; y) = (x) (y) (x+y) , where (x) = R 1 0 t x 1 e t dt is the gamma function. For example, the prior distribution is uniform when = = 1, and hump-shaped if ; > 1. 18 Consumers and …rms are assumed to have the same prior beliefs, but our main results would obtain if we relaxed this assumption. 19 For example, consumers may have lexicographic preferences, with primary preferences for the product itself, and secondary preferences for telling the …rm that they like the product when asked directly. Then a 0-consumer would only reveal his type if it is costly to for him to deviate and claim to be a 1-consumer. successful and meets the target (i.e, p 0 m p 0 m 0 ); and when S = N , the campaign is unsuccessful. We allow the platform to set fees ' S (m) that depend on S and m.
Providing intermediation services costs Z > 0 and the platform market is assumed to be competitive.
We consider the following reward-based crowdfunding setting: Firms obtain funds before they decide whether or not to invest (evening of date 0). This timing discrepancy is the source of moral hazard: …rms have a choice between investing and producing or diverting p 0 m.
While they are not necessary, we examine the role played by reputation costs S 0. To this end, we denote Y the cost of not delivering the product in spite of a successful campaign, which may be interpreted as a mere reputation cost, e.g., of being shamed on social media, or as an expected cost of litigation.
In turn, N captures the cost of a failed campaign if the …rm pursues the project: it re ‡ects either the risk that initially interested consumers lose their interest in the product, or the greater di¢ culty for a …rm to obtain funding from other sources after a failed campaign. For the sake of clarity, we present the results for constant reputation costs. However, all our results hold when reputation costs depend on m. 20 These assumptions re ‡ect the common features adopted by prominent rewardbased crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter and Indiegogo.
3 Benchmark and the value of learning
Updated beliefs
In this benchmark setting, we assume that at date 0 the …rm directly learns the preferences of a sample M of potential consumers. We denote m 2 f0; 1; :::; M g the number of 1-consumers within the sample M .
After the …rm observes m, it updates its expectations about the share of 1consumers in the entire population, N . Since v i j is a Bernoulli trial, mj follows the binomial distribution
Bayes'rule implies
and the posterior distribution is also Beta, with
Therefore, the posterior expectations are
Updated expectations of the share of 1-consumers in the full population is monotonically increasing m. Such Bayesian learning is the source of real option value of learning we discuss later, e.g., when m M > 0 the …rm learns that there are more 1-consumers in its potential market than it expected based on its prior beliefs.
To determine the expected value of learning at date 0, we specify the distribution of m. As shown in (2) m is conditionally binomial, with unknown and drawn from
The shape of the beta-binomial distribution replicates the shape of the underlying prior beta distribution. 21 Unconditional central moments of the beta-binomial variable can be written
The expected m is proportional to the prior mean of the share of 1-consumers, 0 , and for any M > 1; the higher , the lower level of uncertainty about both and m.
First best investment decision
At date 2, the …rm can only sell its product to 1-consumers at price p 2 > 0. Each of these consumers then obtains a surplus 1 p 2 , and at date 1, the expected …rm value is 21 For example, when the prior is uniform, i.e., = 2 and 0 = 1 2 , Pr (m) = 1 M +1 , i.e. the distribution of m is discrete uniform. If …rms prior beliefs are U-shaped (hump-shaped), then the distribution of m, is also U-shaped (hump-shaped).
where m consumers are known to value the product and (N M ) E [ jm] other future consumers are expected to be 1-consumers. It follows immediately that both the …rm value and the joint surplus, i.e. the sum of the payo¤ to the …rm and of the consumer surplus, are maximized when p 2 = 1. The …rm extracts all consumer surplus and invests in all projects that are non-negative NPV based on updated beliefs.
Denoting dxe the ceiling function, i.e. the nearest integer rounded up, we obtain the following proposition: 
When the …rm invests, its NPV is It will be useful to notice that the unconditional date 1 NPV of the project is
the expected value of which at date 0 is
. This implies that if the …rm cannot learn about demand, it invests if, and only if,
We will refer to this benchmark …rm as the reference …rm.
The real option value of learning under the …rst best scheme
At date 0, the (…rm-level) value of learning is the expected value of a …rm that has the opportunity to learn about demand minus the expected value of the reference …rm. Recall that the expected …rm pro…t D (m) at date 1 is (7) and the investment threshold is (6) . From (5) the unconditional expectation of the date 1 pro…t is
which is equal to the expected pro…t of the reference …rm. Therefore, the expected value of learning about demand is
where the superscripts "I" and "N I" denote whether or not the reference …rm 
This guarantees that the investment threshold,m, is above 0 and can be met with a positive probability, i.e.,m 2 f1; 2; :::; M g.
Proposition 2
The value of learning is maximized when I = N 0 . Further, U I is increasing in I and U N I is decreasing in I.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Proposition 2 shows that a …rm that expects to break even based on prior beliefs has most to gain from learning, while the overall relationship between I and the value of learning is hump-shaped. Indeed, the …rst best investment threshold is (weakly) increasing in I. If I < N 0 , the …rm bene…ts from avoiding a sub-optimal investment. This bene…t increases with the investment cost that it expects to save.
If I > N 0 , the …rm bene…ts mostly because it can learn that investment is worth undertaking, and thus the higher I the lower the returns from the investment. The opportunity to learn about demand provides the …rm with a real option.
It is worth noticing that from (6), if I = N 0 , the optimal threshold ism = dM 0 e. Since, from (5), we have M 0 = E [m], the threshold for …rms that have most to gain from learning equals the unconditional expected value of 1-consumers,
i.e.m = dE [m]e : This observation will be useful when we discuss the empirical relevance and testable predictions of our model.
Our setting also enables us to examine the e¤ect of prior uncertainty on the value of learning. With a beta prior, the …rm beliefs are fully characterized by the prior mean 0 and by ; which is inversely related to dispersion.
Proposition 3 Ceteris paribus, the value of learning increases with the degree of prior uncertainty about demand, i.e., it decreases with .
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Proposition 3 shows that …rms with U-shaped prior beliefs, i.e., …rms that expect their product to be valued either by many or by few consumers, have most to gain from learning. Since novel, creative consumer products (e.g., new technology gadgets) are more likely to be characterized by such belief structures than existing products, we expect innovative …rms to bene…t most from learning.
Note that at date 0, a¤ects the …rm value through three channels. First, an increase in uncertainty increases the di¤erence between the …rm prior and updated beliefs about the share of 1-consumers, i.e., jE
Hence, from (7); the expected value of the …rm at date 1 is all the higher (resp. lower)
as the realized value of m exceeds (resp. is lower than) E [m] = M 0 . Second, from equation (6), higher uncertainty may a¤ect the threshold,m, at which the …rm …nds it optimal to invest. Third, the distribution of m with a higher second order stochastically dominates the one with a lower . Overall, the second order stochastic dominance, which implies that the probability of extreme realizations of m decreases with ; ensures that the e¤ect of an increase in uncertainty is positive.
Both the value of learning and its embedded real option increase with the realization of m. Finally, the e¤ect of on the …rst best investment threshold further enhances the bene…t of learning when there is higher uncertainty. We now turn to our main model. While a survey may be unlikely to induce consumers to truthfully reveal their valuation, pre-ordering decisions generate credible information as only 1-consumers are willing to pre-order the product at p 0 > 0.
We derive an optimal crowdfunding scheme, which involves the …rm's choice between an all-or-nothing (AoN) or keep-it-all (KiA) scheme and the choice of a target m 0 and a price p 0 to maximize its expected revenues. Since crowdfunding platforms are perfectly competitive, the expected fee income must equal the cost Z of running the platform, i.e.,
From Section 3.3, we know that when I < I 0 there is no value of learning, which implies that such …rms would choose not to participate in crowdfunding as long as they have alternative ways to …nance their investments. We will therefore focus on the case where I 0 < I < I 0 + M +N +M . The …rm knows M , which is determined by the length of the campaign. It is intuitive that an optimal scheme must induce all 1-consumers to reveal their valuations by pre-ordering the product. We will start by analyzing the schemes separately. In either case we need to derive the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium by backward induction. We then compare the schemes and derive the …rm's utility under the optimal scheme.
All-or-Nothing scheme
It is clear that at date 2 it remains optimal for the …rm to extract all consumer surplus, i.e., p 2 = 1. Let us consider that the crowdfunding stage is informative, i.e., m out of M consumers pre-order the product at date 0. We can then derive that the date 1 investment is worth
where D (m) is de…ned in (7) . There are two incentive compatibility conditions, which determine the …rm's investment decision at date 1:
It is clear that fees do not a¤ect the …rm's date 1 investment decision in either state.
Further, the pre-ordering price, p 0 , does not a¤ect incentive compatibility in either state. In state S = Y , the condition (14), simpli…es to:
The expected sales to new consumers and reputation costs give the …rm incentives to invest and deliver the product. Condition (15) highlights that the …rm may have an incentive to invest even though its crowdfunding campaign does not meet the target.
From the expression for D (m) in (7), the …rm invests if, and only if
Since the …rm's investment decision is independent of p 0 , and the …rm's date 1 pro…t is monotonically increasing in p 0 , the …rm sets the price as high as possible
(provided that rational consumers are willing to participate).
During the afternoon of date 0, each consumer decides whether to pre-order the 
the …rm can pre-sell at a minimum discount, p 0 = 2 , and 1-consumers do not need to actively coordinate in the equilibrium.
Denoting m 0 A the equilibrium target and m A the investment threshold, we obtain the following Proposition describing the …rm's decision. Recall also the …rst best investment thresholdm, de…ned in (6) .
Proposition 4 With AoN:
1) if both reputation costs are small, i.e.,
thenm m N A m Y A . The …rm sets its target to m 0 A = m Y A , but invests whenever m m A = m N A .
2) if the cost of no-delivery is intermediate and the cost of a failed campaign is su¢ ciently high, i.e.,
thenm m Y A m N A . The …rm sets both the target and the investment threshold which probably re ‡ect better the current crowdfunding industry, indicate that the …rm sets the target higher than the optimal level (6) in order to convince consumers to back the project. Indeed, consumers are aware that the funds the …rm receives before it decides whether or not to invest alter its incentives to invest. Hence, they will only back the project if the announced target is high enough. In addition, from (17) , an increase in Y alleviates the moral hazard problem.
Further, the target decreases with N M , and it tends to in…nity when M ! N .
This highlights that in low reputation cost (or weak legal enforcement) environments, pre-selling to all future consumers cannot be achieved though reward-based crowdfunding. This highlights an important feature of third-party reward-based crowdfunding platforms: by keeping the campaigns short, they guarantee that only a subset of consumers can pre-order the product because a limited number of potential consumers can participate on time. From (16) , it appears that M must be su¢ ciently low relative to N . Even if Y ! 0, the …rm chooses to invest as long as the updated beliefs about demand for the remaining N M potential consumers is su¢ ciently high. We argue that updating beliefs is the key driver that makes reward-based crowdfunding incentive compatible and successful. 22 As E [ jm] is increasing in m, campaigns that raise more funds become more likely to deliver rewards.
In contrast, if we did not consider the possibility of updating beliefs, it is clear that as Y ! 0, the …rm would not set the target strategically and would invest if, and only if, (N M ) E [ ] = (N M ) 0 I: From (8) it then follows that the …rm's incentives to invest would be lower after participating in reward-based crowdfunding than before the campaign. Hence, no …rm would participate unless crowdfunding were the only possible source of funding. 23 Part 1 of Proposition 4 shows that the …rm can also bene…t from learning about demand if it does not meet the target. This is consistent with empirical observations that many …rms complete the project after an unsuccessful campaign. Investing in state S = N comes at a potential reputation cost N in the case of a failed campaign. From Proposition 4, both …rms and crowdfunding platforms bene…t from increasing the reputation costs associated with no-delivery, Y , and from reducing the reputation costs due to the failure to meet the target, N . This is again consistent with the recent practice of platforms like Kickstarter, which discloses on its website information about past successful campaigns, but not on failed ones. 24 Overall, when the platform can keep M low enough and the …rm can update its beliefs about demand. AoN crowdfunding is possible and it can achieve the …rst best when Y is su¢ ciently high.
Keep-it-All scheme
The distinct feature of KiA campaigns is that the …rm keeps all the funds raised whether or not it meets the target. Unlike AoN, we assume that the …rm's failure to deliver the product entails a reputation cost Y whether or not it meets the target.
Indeed, under KiA consumers have paid for the product regardless of the target being met. For any S, the …rm invests at date 1 if, and only if 25
which implies that the …rm invests if, and only if,
As before, each consumer i observes other consumers'decisions and anticipates the …rm's investment decision at date 1; i.e., an i-consumer pre-orders the product if, and only if 2 v i Pr (m m K jm; m 0 ) p 0 0:
Even though consumers are not insured against the failure of a campaign, they observe each other's decisions and are able to coordinate and avoid backing a …rm that they expect will not invest at date 1. This implies that the …rm can still set p 0 = 2 , and rational consumers will withdraw their pledges if m < m K . Unlike AoN,
KiA implies that consumers need to coordinate actively in equilibrium. Further, unlike the AoN scheme in which moral hazard is only an issue when the …rm meets its target, the KiA scheme always entails a moral hazard problem. 24 See e.g., "Kickstarter explains why it hides failures" by Chase Ho¤berger (May 31 in The Daily Dot). 25 In state S = Y , the incentive compatibility condition is the same as with the AoN scheme (e.g., 14) , and in S = N , it is p0m
, both simplify to (22) The …rm's incentive compatibility constraints are exactly the same in both states. Denoting the target and investment threshold with m 0 K and m K , respectively, we obtain Proposition 5 With a KiA scheme, 1) if the reputation cost of no-delivery is low, i.e., In general, KiA leads to strictly worse outcomes than AoN. When Y is low, KiA and AoN yield the same outcome after a successful crowdfunding campaign.
However, under AoN, the …rm may bene…t from investing even though its campaign fails because of the value of learning and the absence of moral hazard. If Y is high, then KiA creates another distortion. The …rm may be forced to (over-)invest at date 1, simply to avoid high reputation costs. Hence, the …rm cannot be worse o¤ by choosing AoN.
Interestingly, the target set in a KiA scheme carries little meaning. If N = 0, the …rm can set any target. As long as the failure to meet the target is associated with N > 0, the …rm sets any target m 0 K m K to minimize this cost. KiA also requires more active monitoring to avoid distributing funds to …rms that do not have at least m K 1-consumers.
Expected value under reward-based crowdfunding
Since when Y is su¢ ciently high the investment decision achieves the …rst best, the …rm bene…ts from the real option value of learning minus Z. Low values of Y and N (Part 1 of Proposition 5) are more interesting and more realistic. We have shown that the …rm prefers AoN. We can summarize the expected value of participating in AoN:
The date 0 expected value of participation in AoN is
where m N A and m Y A are given by (18) and (17), respectively. If N ! 0, then
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
Since the …rm does not divert funds in equilibrium, Y has no direct e¤ect on the expected payo¤ to the …rm. Further, the …rst term of U I and U N I is exactly the one we obtained in the …rst best benchmark. In addition, if N ! 0, then the second term is also zero and the comparative statics derived in Section 3.1 apply with the di¤erence that the …rm only participates if its real option value of learning is higher than Z. Interestingly, this is true despite the fact that …rms are forced to set a high target m 0 = m Y A >m as shown in Proposition 4 and in equations (6) and (17) . The main purpose of a feasible target is to ensure that the platform can cover its operating cost while granting the …rm a positive probability of meeting its target. We have also shown that the fee structure does not a¤ect the …rm's decisions. Even when Y ! 0, the platform can ensure that reward-based crowdfunding is possible by keeping the number of participants, M , limited and by guaranteeing transparency.
Firm characteristics and AoN project funding.
We have shown that even in a low reputation cost environment, the …rm can learn 
which is satis…ed when
Since > 0, if the campaign does not reach out to more that half of the potential consumers, a successful campaign does indeed cover the investment cost as long as the target is feasible, i.e. m BE Y A M . This is realistic given the short duration of campaigns. Further, as increases, so does the real option value of learning, and the …rm may be able to reach more than half of its consumers at the cost of a higher threshold. Hence, AoN funds the …rm's investment. Further, this …rm would likely have better access to external funding after a failed campaign with Finally, a …rm with a positive NPV project based on prior beliefs (i.e., < 0) and with high reputation costs is likely to set a target that does not cover its investments needs. Indeed, this …rm can set a lower target that guarantees incentive compatibility. While, in our model, the …rm can do so as it has frictionless access to external funding, it can also realistically be expected to not be …nancially constrained.
Discussion and extensions
Role of third-party platforms In Section 4, we have shown that the …rst best characterized in Section 3 can nearly be achieved by AoN. But when are third-party platforms needed? Are features such as transparency optimal? In Online Appendix B, we allow the …rm to design its own pre-selling scheme, and to pre-commit to it. As one would expect, the …rst best can be achieved with full insurance, i.e., full money-back guarantees, in the case of no-investment. However, we prove that in the environment where the …rm's ability to o¤er such insurance is limited, the …rm would indeed choose to pre-commit to transparency and to a limited M . This shows the rationale for third-party platforms. Both transparency and limited M are features that many …rms are unable to commit to on their own. This is because another moral hazard problem would arise: when the …rm's pre-ordering scheme lacks interest, the …rm may learn that it is sub-optimal to invest. The …rm then still has incentives to divert as many funds as possible, which can be achieved by keeping the pre-ordering possibility ongoing and/or by overstating the number of consumers that have pre-ordered. Hence, reward-based crowdfunding bene…ts …rms that cannot credibly, directly pre-commit to deliver the product and that need a third-party to facilitate commitment.
Variable costs In the main model we considered zero variable costs. Suppose instead that a …xed cost I F is paid at date 1 and a variable cost I V 2 (0; 1) is paid at date 2. As in the main setting, the highest price at which the …rm can pre-sell the product is p 0 = 2 . Then the date 1 expected pro…t is
, the date 1 pro…t equal to
where D (m) is as in (7). The …rst best investment threshold is the same as the one derived in Section 3 and all comparative statics regarding this remain valid. Since I is increasing in I V , an increase in the variable cost increases the threshold at which the …rm is willing to invest.
Reasoning as in Section 4, the …rm has incentives to invest at date 1 under AoN if, and only if
When diverting funds, the …rm now also avoids the variable cost. The thresholds can be written
The variable cost increases the thresholds for investment in both states. Further, the threshold m Y A increases too. Intuitively, the variable cost increases the severity of the moral hazard problem, which increases the di¢ culty of crowdfunding. This implies that …rms with high variable costs relative to …xed costs are likely to …nd it di¢ cult to participate and bene…t from crowdfunding. All the other results in the preceding sections remain.
Uncertainty We assumed that whenever the …rm invests, it will succeed to produce the product. Suppose instead that the investment leads to success with probability 2 (0; 1]. Hence, the …rm's date 1 pro…t is
In addition, the consumers who pre-order the product know that they will receive it with probability only. Hence, they are willing to buy if, and only, if p 0 2 .
The …rm has to o¤er a larger discount in order to convince consumers to participate and sets p 0 = 2 . The new value of (7) is then
This implies that all our qualitative results remain valid. In particular the …rst best investment threshold and the value of learning are the same as in Section 3, with the only di¤erence being that we substitute I= for I. The results of Section 4 also remain similar, with investment thresholds with an AoN scheme satisfying:
The uncertainty about the …rm's ability to deliver the product increases the thresh-
olds.
A risk of delayed delivery would yield similar results. It would also increase both the discount that the …rm would need to o¤er at the pre-selling stage and the investment thresholds.
Overall, both uncertainty about the …rm's ability to deliver the product and variable costs imply higher investment thresholds, which implies that successful crowdfunding will be more di¢ cult. The intuition for these e¤ects is simple, as both imply lower expected payo¤s to the …rm. In addition, uncertainty about the …rm's ability to deliver the product implies that the …rm must o¤er consumers larger discounts at the pre-selling stage.
Empirical implications
In this section we highlight empirical facts and several testable implications of our model. Our discussion relates to recent empirical work as well as to the information that we have collected from Kickstarter on all the projects successfully funded in the Technology and Theatre categories from January 1, 2015 to September 17, 2015.
These categories are informative as they represent opposite ends of the spectrum of available project types. While the technology category is the one most directly related to our model, the theatre category enables us to discuss our …ndings in the light of other project categories. It is worth noting that in theatre projects, rewards are generally consumer products such as tickets to a show or to a rehearsal.
1) Importance of learning about the demand.
In our model, the …rms that choose to pre-sell a product update their beliefs in Bayesian fashion following pre-ordering decisions made by rational consumers. This is consistent with the empirical …ndings in Xu (2016) Pr pm p m < xjpm p m in both categories based on these 2015 data. Over-pledging in successful projects appears to be the rule rather than the exception, especially in the technology category. Our model di¤ers from the existing alternative explanations in that respect. If crowdfunding was primarily about participants helping a credit constrained …rm to raise enough funds in order to invest (see Strausz, 2016) , or about being pivotal in ensuring that a likeable product exists (see Varian, 2013) , we should not observe systematic over-pledging. Varian's model allows for overpledging, but only to the degree that each pivotal individual wants to obtain the full gift for his contribution, the amount of which can exceed the target. This could explain some over-pledging, but not the magnitude of over-pledging observed, especially for technology projects. While we observe systematic, massive over-pledging, there exists a view that with the exception of a few most successful projects, most projects succeed small and fail big (see Mollick 2012) . Our model and our preliminary evidence suggest that one should relate the degree of over-pledging to the characteristics of the project. Statistically we expect over-pledging to increase with project uncertainty, e.g. it should be higher in technology than in theatre projects, which is consistent with our illustration. We argue that most pro…table projects should systematically succeed big, even though they also fail more often.
3) If the moral hazard problem is severe, …rms set the target too high.
In the introduction, we have discussed the theoretical debate about the severity of moral hazard, and the question whether reputation costs are high enough to eliminate this concern. Our model provides a structure to test the severity of moral hazard and/or the importance of reputation costs, but requires a few steps to build the logic. We have shown that with the optimal contract, the …rms that bene…t most from pre-selling the product are those that would break even without crowdfunding.
These …rms set the target such that E h pm p m i = 1, i.e., a break even …rm sets the target such that it expects to meet the target without exceeding it. If the set of …rms that engage in crowdfunding were able to set the optimal target, we would expect …rms to set varying targets with E is 0:95 for technology and 0:45 for theatre projects. While this suggests that technology projects may involve higher reputation costs than theatre projects, further empirical analysis is needed to establish further evidence. Overall, these stylized facts indicate that moral hazard is not negligible.
4) Relationship between …rm characteristics and crowdfunding
Our model provides a clear parametric statistical structure that can be used to analyze the …rm's prior beliefs based on the realized data. One of our predictions is that greater uncertainty makes projects and participation more pro…table. In Appendix A.7 we construct the full distribution of pm p m for technology and theatre project. The data is consistent with the intuition that technology projects are riskier than theatre projects in the sense of second order stochastic dominance. In the context of our model, this explains why technology …rms participate more often (7/1 ratio for live projects) and raise more money on average than theatre …rms. This is also consistent with Xu (2016) , who shows that the …rms that face more uncertainty are those that continue to participate in reward-based crowdfunding after the terms of their funding have been improved.
Our model can also shed light on the link between funding targets and …rm characteristics, e.g., investment costs, variable costs and project types. In addition, the main distributional parameters of the prior (the parameters of beta distribution) could also be estimated using project data. This enables future researchers to see how prior beliefs di¤er across di¤erent categories and project sizes.
5) Post-crowfunding stage
Our results predict that many …rms crowdfunding a project through an All-or-Nothing scheme will keep pursuing their project. This is consistent with the observations made by Mollick (2014) who presents survey results showing that many …rms continue to pursue their projects even though they fail to meet their target.
In our model, consumers are rational with standard preferences, so we predict that there should be a discount rather than a premium at the crowdfunding stage. While we do not have enough data to test this, anecdotal evidence based on …rms' an- 
Conclusion
This paper developed a model in which reward-based crowdfunding platforms enable …rms to pre-sell a product they may wish to develop and to learn whether there is enough demand for it. This in turn enables …rms to make more informed investment decisions, and is most bene…cial for …rms that face su¢ ciently high demand uncertainty and investments costs. The relationship between investment costs and the value of crowdfunding is inverted U-shaped.
We showed that all-or-nothing crowdfunding schemes are not only more e¢ cient than keep-it-all schemes, but also nearly as e¢ cient as a frictionless consumer survey where individuals truthfully reveal their preferences. This is in spite of backers being exposed to the risk of the …rm diverting funds after the campaign. Rational backers overcome this friction by coordinating not to back …rms that they expect to have insu¢ cient incentives to invest. We show that because of the real option value of learning, projects that raise more funds give …rms greater incentives to invest instead of diverting funds. In equilibrium, the …rm sets a su¢ ciently ambitious target to reassure backers that the …rm will invest. As a result, the …rm can o¤er consumers the possibility to pre-order the product at a minimal discount. Setting a target that is higher than the …rst-best investment threshold does not necessarily hurt the …rm, as …rms bene…t from learning and may choose to invest even after a failed crowdfunding campaign.
Further, we show that …rms that can pre-commit to a full-money back guarantee do not need third-party platforms. Instead, they can o¤er consumers the possibility to pre-order products on their own website. This is consistent with pre-orderings available on the websites of well established corporations such as iTunes and travel agencies. However, most …rms are less known and cannot pre-commit to moneyback guarantees. Third-party crowdfunding platforms bring value to these …rms because they facilitate commitment to abide by features that overcome moral hazard. We show that a limited length of campaigns and transparency are su¢ cient to make pre-selling campaigns incentive compatible. Further, …rms that cannot credibly commit to money-back guarantees would like to pre-commit to these contractual features but …nd it di¢ cult. In addition, other mechanisms such as stronger legal enforcement would enable …rms to alleviate moral hazard further. While these recommendations are natural in our model, they may entail further incentive problems.
For example, stronger legal enforcement would discourage …rms that face innovation uncertainty from participating in crowdfunding.
More broadly, we argue that reward-based crowdfunding overcomes a set of traditional frictions by enabling …rms and consumers to interact directly. Our model also suggests that the direct interactions provided by internet websites and social media, which are widely used to build reputations but may also entail reputation costs, have enabled crowdfunding platforms to develop. Our argument suggests that learning about demand is facilitated by reward-based crowdfunding: While investorbased crowdfunding relies on investors forming beliefs about the …rm's sales and cash ‡ows, common transparent reward-based crowdfunding relies on each consumer making backing decisions based on his own valuation.
In our model, the only parameter the …rm can learn about is total demand. In reality, the bene…ts can extend to learning about consumer preferences about the speci…cations of the product, e.g., the color of the Pebble watch or the features of a new game. We argue that to fully understand the success of reward-based crowdfunding, it is important to consider its role as a learning device, rather than focusing on a mere funding scheme. Our model can explain the following stylized facts: 1) a noticeable proportion of …rms that fail to meet their target in a crowdfunding campaign still complete the project, 2) many successful projects receive amounts noticeably higher than the target amount, 3) rich and famous companies have crowdfunded projects 26 , 4) …rms that develop riskier products that involve su¢ ciently high investment costs and have high demand uncertainty, e.g. technology gadgets, appear to seek reward-based crowdfunding most often. We also predict that …rms o¤er products at par or at a discount rather than premium during crowdfunding campaigns. These features are speci…c to our model and would enable to test our predictions relative to alternative papers.
We argue that reward-based crowdfunding is complementary to more traditional sources of external …nancing, e.g., angel or venture capital investors could o¤er …nancing conditional on a successful crowdfunding campaign. This is indeed what happened to Pebble, which was turned down by many venture capitalists before its …rst Kickstarter campaign, but raised $15M in venture capital from CRV after the campaign. 27 There can also be more subtle interactions between …nancing needs and reward-based crowdfunding, e.g., the public nature of crowdfunding is likely to mitigate asymmetric information problems between …rms and investors. These interactions would be an interesting avenue for future research.
A Appendix
A.1 Introductory lemmas Lemma 7 For any c 2 f0; 1; :::; M g, E [mjm c] is decreasing in c.
Proof. Since c is an integer, it is su¢ cient to show that for any c 2 f0; 1; :::; M g we have
which can be expressed as
Simplifying, we obtain
where the inequality holds because m c > 0 for any c + 1 m M and with a beta-binomial distribution, q m > 0 for any m. imized when c =m, wherem is given by (6) .
Proof. As c is an integer, consider the di¤erence
Since q c > 0 for any c, the di¤erence has the same sign as D (c) q c . From (6) and (7), we obtain is maximized when c =m.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We only need to consider I 0 < I < I 0 + M +N +M , as the value of learning is zero otherwise. From (6) , it is clear thatm is weakly increasing in I. Consider I < N 0 . From (7) and (10), the expected value of learning is
Since D (m) = I +N +M m I 0 is positive and increasing in I for any m <m and I < N 0 , and sincem is weakly increasing in I, we obtain that U I is increasing in I.
Consider I > N 0 . From (7) and (11), the expected value of learning is 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
For the sake of exposition, we have limited indexing the variables of interest in the main text and only highlighted the dependence on m. For this proof it is necessary to consider the dependence on . We denote . The equations in (27) are identical to (4), (6) and (7) respectively. We also denote the cumulative distribution of m
Since the distribution of m is beta-binomial, for any pair 2 f 1 ; 2 g such that 2 > 1 , the distribution with higher 2 second order stochastically dominates (SOSD) the one with 1 , i.e.,
for all m = f0; 1; :::; M g; the inequality is strict for m < M 1. 28
From (10) and (11), we obtain
From Abel's Lemma 29 , and D (m + 1; ) D (m; ) = +N +M ;
We can express the investment threshold as
where 0 " ( ) < 1 is the rounding error. Using (27) and (31) 
Replacing (30) and (32) in (29), we express the …rm's expected value of learning as
From (27), we obtainm 28 This can be proved analytically from the fact that beta-binomial distributions have a unimodal likelihood ratio, which implies second order stochastic dominance. See Hopkins, Kornienko, 2003 for the proof of continuous distributions, the proof for discrete distributions is available upon request. 29 
If I = N 0 , thenm ( 2 ) =m ( 1 ) = I is independent of . Since the e¤ect of on the …rms that would break even without learning is di¤erent from its e¤ect on the …rms that would not, we analyze these two cases separately.
Case 1: …rms with I < N 0
In this case, we havem ( 2 ) m ( 1 ). We denote m = (m ( 2 ) m ( 1 )), where m = f0; 1; :::g. From (31), we obtain
This and (33) enable us to decompose the e¤ect of an increase in as
The due to second order stochastic dominance (28) .
If m > 0, then we can further decompose
which is non-negative for any m > 0, because of second order stochastic dominance (28) and because the cumulative probability is increasing in m. Hence the value of learning decreases with for all …rms with I < N 0 .
Case 2: …rms with I N 0
In this case, we havem ( 2 ) m ( 1 ). We again denote m =m ( 2 ) m ( 1 ), where m = f0; 1; :::g and from (31) we obtain the following relationship between " ( 1 ) and " ( 2 ):
The above and (33) enable us to decompose again the e¤ect of an increase in as
It is clear that the second term of (37) is non-positive and it is strictly negative if N < M; because U N I ( 2 ) > 0, and I N 0 . As in case 1, it is easy to see that if m = 0, thenm ( 1 ) =m ( 2 ) and G N I 1 + G N I 2 + G N I 3 0. If m > 0, then we can follow the same derivation as before to prove that G N I 1 + G N I 2 + G N I 3 0 (keeping in in mind that nowm ( 2 ) >m ( 1 )).
This proves that value of learning is higher if there is more uncertainty, i.e.,
lower .

A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The …rm's investment decisions are characterized by (17) and (18) for states S = Y and S = N . We aim to …nd the target m 0 , that maximizes …rms expected pro…t.
Because consumers observe each other's decisions, they coordinate to back the …rm only if the m m Y A The …rm does not bene…t from setting a target below the investment threshold, which implies that
From (18), we havem m N A . The ordering betweenm, m Y A , m N A depends on parameters Y and N . We have the following possibilities: 1)m m N A m Y A ;
2)m m Y A m N A ; 3) m Y A m m N A ; and need to analyze each of these cases separately.
From (17) and (38), the …rm always invests if it meets target m 0 . However, it also has incentives to invest provided that m m N A if it does not meet the target.
Given the payo¤ structure in Section 4.1, platform's break even condition (12) , the expected …rm value at date 0 is
The only term that depends on the announced target is the expected reputation cost, Pr ( m N A m < m 0 ) N 0. In order to minimize this cost, it is optimal for the …rm to set m 0 as low as possible. Given the constraint (38), the …rm optimally From Lemma 8, the …rst term is maximized at m 0 =m, and therefore the …rm sets
From (6) and (17), we obtain that
In addition, from (17) and (18), we obtain that
Combining these results, we obtain Proposition 4.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
The …rm only obtains funds if consumers expect it to actually invest at date 1.
That is, whether or not the …rm meets the target, it will obtain funds if m m K .
The …rm's choice over the target alters only its expected reputation costs. Suppose that the …rm announces a target m 0 m K . From the table in Section 4.2 and the platform's break even condition (12) , the payo¤ to the …rm is
In order to minimize expected reputation costs, the …rm could set the target to m 0 = m K . However, the …rm could also set a lower target. Suppose that it sets m 0 m K . Using again the platform's break even condition (12) , this implies that the payo¤ to the …rm is
As the result the …rm's best response is to set any target m 0 m K .
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
This follows from Part 1 in Proposition 4, (38), and law of total expectations. We also account for the fact that the opportunity cost for a …rm with I N 0 (resp. x .
B For Online Publication
B.1 Pre-selling with pre-commitment
We modify the setting of Figure 1 as follows. While a frictionless consumer survey remains unrealistic, we assume here that instead of pre-selling a product through a third-party platform, the …rm can choose whether or not to crowdfund its project, and commits to the main features of its own pre-selling scheme at date 0 in the morning. As before, provided the …rm decides to pre-sell its product, it sets p 0 at date 0 at mid-day, and a sample of M consumers decide whether to pre-order the product at date 0 in the afternoon. At date 0 in the evening, the …rm receives funds, if any, and the rest of the game proceeds as before. In this section, we also prove formally some statements made in Section 4.
In Section 3, we established that there is no value of learning for …rms with I I 0 . Firms with I I 0 always invest at date 1 and can therefore credibly commit to deliver the product regardless of the pre-selling scheme. However, these …rms have nothing to gain from pre-selling future products be it directly or through third party platforms. In what follows, we focus on the case where I > I 0 .
B.1.1 Full money-back guarantees
The …rst contractual feature the …rm could commit to is a money-back guarantee that fully insures the consumers who pre-ordered the product at date 0 against a decision to not invest at date 1.
Proposition 9
Pre-selling with a full money-back guarantee achieves the …rst-best as a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). In such SPNE, p 0 = 2 , p 2 = 1, and all 1-consumers in sample M pre-order the product.
Proof. We derive SPNE by backward induction. At date 2, only 1-consumers are willing to buy the product at the positive price, and they buy it at any p 2 1.
Because the …rm's pro…t at date 2 is increasing in p 2 , the …rm sets p 2 = 1. At date 1, provided that m M consumers pre-ordered the product, the …rm's expected pro…t
is de…ned in (7) . It obtains zero if it does not invest. Consumers are fully insured against no investment. Therefore, they pre-order the product if, and only if, p 0 2 ; i.e., whenever the price compensates them for the time value of money. As the …rm's expected pro…t at date 0 is increasing in p 0 , the …rm optimally sets p 0 = 2 . As 0-consumers do not pre-order the product at p 0 = 2 > 0; the …rm credibly learns about demand at date 1. Further, the …rm's investment decision remains identical to the …rst best described in Proposition 1 and all payo¤s are the same as under the …rst best outcome.
Proposition 4 highlights that pre-selling the product with a full-money back guarantee is an e¢ cient mechanism to learn about demand and leads to the …rst best. Yet, it requires …rms to be able to, and to choose to, pre-commit to such guarantees. While travel agencies, governed by regulation, and large, well known corporations such as Apple and Sony, which o¤er pre-ordering possibility for many products through iTunes and Playstation, are likely to be able to credibly commit to such guarantees, smaller, innovative companies are likely unable to do so.
B.1.2 Limited money-back guarantees and the value of transparency
Whenever the …rm cannot commit to a full-money back guarantee, the consumers who pre-ordered the product need to form beliefs about the actions from other consumers, as it determines the probability with which they will receive the product at date 2. We consider two main contractual features that the …rm can commit to at date 0 in the morning: a limited money-back guarantee and transparency. A limited money-back guarantee implies that the …rm can pre-commit to return consumers a fraction 1 of the funds that they contributed at date 0 if the …rm does not invest at date 1, where 2 [ ; 1] ; with > 0. The purpose of the money-back guarantee is similar to that of the reputation cost of no-delivery in Section 3.
The transparency choice is as follows. We denote 2 fOP; T Rg the choice of the information that is available to backers about other backer pledges at date 0. When the …rm commits to transparency, = T R; consumers play a simultaneous move game with perfect information. When = OP , consumers play a simultaneous move game with imperfect information. That is, they cannot observe the decisions made by other backers, and they decide simultaneously whether or not to pre-order the product at date 0: Hence, each consumer needs to form beliefs about other consumer preferences and participation decisions based on his own valuation for the product and the distribution of other valuations.
We proceed by backward induction, and as before, at date 2, it is optimal for the …rm to capture all consumer surplus by setting p 2 = 1. At date 1, suppose that all 1-consumers in sample M pre-ordered the product at date 0. 30 Since the …rm raised p 0 m at date 0, the …rm invests if, and only if,
From (3), we obtain that the …rm invests at date 1 if, and only if,
If the …rm invests, its expected value at date 1 is
We then turn to the backer's decision to pre-order the product at date 0. Since 0-consumers do not buy the product, we focus on the decisions made by 1-consumers under both transparency and opacity. As consumers are forward looking and rational, they correctly anticipate the …rm's investment decision at date 1. We can characterize consumer best responses for any I > I 0 as follows. With = OP , backers cannot coordinate. Hence, when they decide whether or not to pre-order the product, they need to form beliefs about the probability that that the …rm will invest and that they will receive the product. When > 0, the backers need to be compensated for the risk that the …rm may not deliver the product and generally require a larger discount.
also be eliminated if we assume that consumers have lexicographic preferences.
Finally, from (40), E [ 1 jm] increases with p 0 , and hence so does date 1's expected pro…t. Therefore, the …rm sets p 0 = 2 if = T R, and (43) if = OP .
When choosing at date 0, the …rm faces a trade-o¤ between the bene…t of keeping some of the funds raised if it chooses to not invest and the discount it needs to o¤er to at date 0 to induce rational backers to participate.
Proposition 11 For any , the …rm is weakly better o¤ under transparency. Therefore, = T R is always an optimal equilibrium strategy for the …rm. 31 Proof. See Appendix B.3.
Proposition 11 shows that the …rm chooses transparency over opacity at any
given . The intuition is as follows. Suppose that the …rm has the same investment threshold under = T R and = OP . Then the discount the …rm needs to o¤er under = OP is su¢ ciently large to compensate for any bene…t of keeping funds in the case where the number of consumers who pre-order the product is low. In addition, as we show, the optimal investment threshold at date 1 is weakly higher under = OP than under = T R, which provides the …rm with another bene…t of choosing = T R:
We now turn to the optimal full-commitment scheme. Proposition 12 shows that the …rm that can pre-commit chooses transarency and the highest level of money-back guarantee, i.e., the lowest , that it can commit to.
Since transparency dominates opacity for any , backers only back …rms that they expect will have su¢ cient incentives to invest. The threshold for investment must be lower than the …rst best thresholdm de…ned in (6) and it decreases with . As the expected …rm payo¤ from pre-selling the product decreases with the threshold, the …rm bene…ts from committing to the highest feasible level of money-back guarantee.
We obtain the following result for the opposite limit:
Corollary 13 If the …rm cannot commit to any money-back guarantee, i.e., = 1;
pre-selling the product to all potential consumers is not incentive compatible even though = T R. This echoes the earlier result that it is impossible to pre-sell the product to all potential consumers if the reputation cost of no-delivery is low. This is because this reputation cost and the money-back guarantee serve exactly the same role.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 10
For a 1-consumer, the opportunity cost of waiting is zero, either because there is no product or because the …rm extracts all consumer surplus at date 2 by setting p 2 = 1.
Consider = T R. Consumer i observes the number of other consumers who pre-order the product, m i . If m i m 1, then if a 1-consumer backs the project at date 0, the …rm will invest at date 1 with probability 1 and the consumer's utility from pre-ordering the product is 2 1 p 0 . Hence he participates as long as 2 p 0 0. Further, the condition m i m 1 is equivalent to m = m i + 1 m.
If m i < m 1, then the …rm will not invest with probability 1 and consumer i may be unable to buy the product at date 2. The utility from pre-ordering the product is p 0 + (1 ) p 0 = p 0 < 0 for any > 0.
Consider now = OP . Then 1-consumer i knows the distribution of m and the impact of his decision on m. Then, the …rm will invest with probability Pr (m mjm 1) (resp. Pr (m mjm M 1)) if he participates (resp. does not participate).Hence, 1-consumers make identical decisions to back the project,
if, and only if
Pr (m mjm 1) 2 p 0 Pr (m < mjm 1) p 0 0, which simpli…es to (43).
B.3 Proof of Proposition 11
The …rm sets p 0 as high as possible subject to 1-consumer's participation constraint (10) . We denote m the investment threshold under and E [ 0; ] ( ) the corresponding date 0 expected …rm value.
From (41) We proceed in two steps.
Step 1: Let us …x , with a corresponding m OP ( ). From (44) 
i.e., the loss from setting a lower price under = OP must be higher than the bene…t of keeping the funds. From the law of total expectations and from (46) 
